



# The Legitimacy of Sustainability Initiatives in Tanzania

Rasul Ahmed Minja<sup>1</sup> · Stefano Ponte<sup>2</sup> · Asubisye Mwamfupe<sup>1</sup> · Christine Noe<sup>1</sup> · Daniel Brockington<sup>3</sup>

Accepted: 6 January 2022

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## Abstract

In this article, we examine selected sustainability initiatives from the perspective of local communities to improve our understanding of how putative participatory schemes manage legitimacy. Understanding the legitimacy dynamics of sustainability initiatives is important, as it potentially minimizes the power gaps likely to open across scales and jurisdictions. We analyze selected sustainability initiatives in southern Tanzania dealing with wildlife, forest, and coastal resources and find that they have generally struggled to manage input, process, and impact legitimacy—except for the community-based forestry initiatives. They have been more inclined towards providing training on conservation issues than facilitating alternative livelihood activities. While they are perceived as having achieved some improvements in environmental conditions, they have had minimal effects on socio-economic and livelihood outcomes. This has culminated into significant levels of community dissatisfaction with their performance, which questions their long-term viability.

**Keywords** Sustainability · Legitimacy · Conservation · Forestry · Coastal · Wildlife resources · Tanzania

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✉ Rasul Ahmed Minja  
[rasul@udsm.ac.tz](mailto:rasul@udsm.ac.tz)

Stefano Ponte  
[spo.msc@cbs.dk](mailto:spo.msc@cbs.dk); [Sp.dbp@cbs.dk](mailto:Sp.dbp@cbs.dk)

Asubisye Mwamfupe  
[asumwamfupe@gmail.com](mailto:asumwamfupe@gmail.com)

Christine Noe  
[tinanoe@yahoo.com](mailto:tinanoe@yahoo.com)

Daniel Brockington  
[d.brockington@sheffield.ac.uk](mailto:d.brockington@sheffield.ac.uk)

<sup>1</sup> University of Dar es Salaam, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

<sup>2</sup> Copenhagen Business School, Copenhagen, Denmark

<sup>3</sup> University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK



## Résumé

Dans cet article, nous adoptons le point de vue des communautés locales pour examiner certaines initiatives de développement durable, afin d'améliorer notre compréhension de la manière dont les programmes prétendent participatifs gèrent leur légitimité. Il est important de comprendre la dynamique concernant la légitimité des initiatives de développement durable, car cela permet de faire des compromis au niveau de la juridiction la plus basse possible, ce qui minimise ainsi potentiellement les écarts de pouvoir susceptibles de produire entre différentes échelles et juridictions. Nous analysons une sélection d'initiatives de développement durable mises en œuvre dans le sud de la Tanzanie et qui ont pour thématiques la faune, les forêts et les ressources côtières. Nous constatons qu'à l'exception des initiatives forestières communautaires, ces initiatives ont généralement eu du mal à gérer la légitimité au niveau des intrants, des processus et de l'impact. Les initiatives ont eu plus tendance à dispenser des formations sur les questions de conservation qu'à faciliter le développement d'autres activités de subsistance. Bien qu'elles soient perçues comme ayant permis certaines améliorations au niveau des conditions environnementales, leurs effets sur les niveaux socio-économiques et sur les moyens de subsistance ont été minimes. Cela a abouti à une insatisfaction conséquente quant à leur performance au sein de la communauté, ce qui remet en question leur viabilité à long terme.

## Introduction

One of the chief concerns of new initiatives that seek sustainability in the management of natural resources and which involve public and private actors is to build and retain legitimacy among different audiences and stakeholders. This is important because they cannot lean exclusively on the sovereign nature of the state to impart their authority (Bernstein and Cashore 2007; Black 2008). The history of natural resource management in much of the world from colonial times to recent years indicates that these initiatives were originally introduced primarily to protect natural resources to generate revenue for the state, often at the expense of local livelihoods. Creating protected areas of various wildlife, forestry, and coastal environments often involved residents' exclusion and economic displacement. As a result, local communities frequently opted to challenge what they perceived as 'coercive and ineffective state structures and policies for managing resources' (Spaeder and Feit 2005, p. 149).

These policies often are unsatisfactory because of the violence and inefficiencies they can entail (Western and Wright 1994). One response has been to introduce policy and actual implementation of decentralized forms of governance that combine conservation and development objectives (Goble et al. 2014), following concerns that the degree of community or resource user group involvement in conservation initiatives and programs had been previously minimal or absent. One feature of adopting more decentralized governance of natural resources, especially in the past three decades, has been its increasing use of initiatives involving communities, different layers of government, civil society groups, and sometimes business.



Some of the main preoccupations in research examining these initiatives have been the dynamics of community participation, the scale of operations, and the legitimacy of these initiatives as governance instruments (see, i.e., Gustavson et al. 2009; Levine 2002; Makoloweka and Shurcliff 1997; Tobey and Torell 2006; Wells et al. 2010), including how community contestation can affect the dynamics of (re) regulation of access and control (Benjaminsen et al. 2013). This work has shown that sustainability initiatives are characterized by dynamic elements constantly renegotiated by the individuals and institutions involved. Therefore, it is essential to assess legitimacy not only through an analysis of institutions but also on how rules are applied in practice (Beaumont and Dredge 2010; Bramwell 2011; Ribot 1999). Much of the work that has engaged with legitimacy within these larger debates has attempted to understand whether different forms of participation and institutional setup shape the acceptance and recognition of sustainability initiatives and redistribute power to previously excluded sections of society (Ruiz-Mallén et al. 2015; Hyle et al. 2019) or whether they are used to simply consult the local population (Delgado-Serrano et al. 2017).

Tanzania is an ideal case to study legitimacy in sustainability initiatives because it is considered a model of decentralization and of implementation of participatory approaches in forestry, wildlife, and coastal resources. This is also because, unlike other countries in eastern and southern Africa, Tanzania does not have the problem of defining what is a ‘community’ in community-based natural resource governance (Ponte et al. 2017).

In this article, we seek to examine, from a comparative perspective, different aspects of legitimacy that could explain variation in the perceived performance of conservation-cum-development initiatives in wildlife, forestry, and coastal sectors in southern Tanzania. We pay particular attention to how these initiatives operate rather than to their ‘ideal’ institutional features. In the next section, we briefly discuss the concept of legitimacy and its relevance for understanding processes and outcomes in conservation-cum-development interventions. In section three, we discuss our site selection logic and data collection methods. In section four, we empirically assess the input, process, and impact legitimacy of the selected sustainability initiatives. In the final section, we discuss the significance of our findings, provide conclusions, and discuss a future research agenda.

## Legitimacy

A large body of literature has analyzed community participation in the governance of natural resources. Much has focused on processes and impacts of participatory approaches (Abbott 1995; Murphree 2009; Ribot 1999), the actual practices of different actors and their roles and interests in entering an initiative (Igoe 2010; Sachedina 2010; Saito-Jensen et al. 2010), and the relations of power that determine the distribution of costs and benefits (Benjaminsen et al. 2013; Dressler et al. 2010; Moyo et al. 2016).

This literature highlights a systematic disjuncture between discourses and actual practices of donors and governments about participation, representation,



and inclusiveness of conservation (Ece et al. 2017; Wearing and Wearing 1999). It also highlights how governance reforms have often led to a narrowing of democracy—to counting numbers of participants and/or group representation rather than considering community values, needs, and priorities. Existing work also critiques powerful actors' practices, interests, and roles in facilitating initiatives with local communities—showing that their actions have empowered some actors while disempowering those already marginalized by conservation schemes (Dzingirai 2003; Moscardo 2011; Sunseri 2005; Wearing and Wearing 1999). Since the initial focus of these initiatives had been around benefit sharing, rather than cost–benefit sharing (Brockington 2007), most schemes have often led to cynicism rather than hope for local communities, have increased community burdens, have reinforced state control over natural resources (Benjaminsen et al. 2013; Dressler et al. 2010), and have failed to achieve their ultimate goals (Moscardo 2011; Noe and Kangalawe 2015; Stonich 1998).

Sustainability initiatives are often part of larger processes that operate at the global level and are embedded in local and national political economies that co-shape their trajectories and outcomes. The desire to initiate conservation efforts requires the mobilization of 'grassroot' efforts. Accordingly, these initiatives are supposed to follow the Convention on Biological Diversity and, thus, require establishing links between conservation and local development objectives (Berkes 2007; Kottak 1999). However, critiques of community participation are often limited to the local practices of different actors rather than the overall process at different scales. Likewise, the assessment of costs and benefits of community participation does not consider changes in what is considered a desirable scale of conservation and how its construction necessitates the collaboration of different actors that may have different interests and resources at their disposal (Kottak 1999; Legg 2009; Ramutsindela and Noe 2015). Overall, there seems to be a systematic disjuncture between global discourses and local narratives (Berkes 2007; Ribot 2003), and participation often appears to be symbolic rather than substantive (Ece et al. 2017)—sometimes even leading to disempowerment (Brockington 2005; Noe and Kangalawe 2015).

Because sustainability initiatives that seek to govern natural resources bring together different state and non-state actors with often diverse and competing interests, it is important to examine the dynamics highlighted in this literature through the lenses of legitimacy. The discussion above suggests that participation per se does not build legitimacy, which is often viewed in the literature as a 'process where partnerships gain recognition and become accepted as a relevant alternative or supplement to government policy on a particular issue' (Glasbergen et al. 2007). But what are the different kinds and the constitutive elements of legitimacy?

Recent research on sustainability initiatives has highlighted the importance of managing legitimacy from the viewpoint of the perceptions arising from different audiences and stakeholders (Bernstein and Cashore 2007; Glasbergen et al. 2007; Guldbrandsen 2010, 2014). The perceptions that rights are appropriately exercised are a crucial element of legitimacy, and audiences, in this case, have come to be conceptualized as including both state and societal actors, from government elites to ordinary citizens (Tallberg and Zürn 2019).



This body of work shows that sustainability initiatives attempt to manage different kinds of legitimacy (Bernstein and Cashore 2007; Glasbergen et al. 2007; Bernstein 2011; Guldbrandsen 2010, 2014). Input legitimacy and process legitimacy deal with perceptions related to procedural fairness, where the focus is on the quality of the decision-making process in terms of deliberation, participation, transparency, and accountability. *Input legitimacy* includes the perceptions of stakeholders on the dynamics of participation of various categories of actors and groups in the design and operation of initiatives, and on the balance in the type, origin and function of stakeholder participation. The idea here is that stakeholders need to perceive that there is meaningful participation of all actors and interests (Bäckstrand 2006; Bernstein 2011; Partzsch 2011; Slager et al. 2012)—and particularly of marginalized groups (e.g., Miller and Bush 2015; Ponte 2014; de Bakker et al. 2019). *Process legitimacy* relates to perceptions on procedures allowing or limiting participation and democratic process, the quality of governance procedures, the levels of trust accruing in the system, and appropriate accountability and transparency.

*Impact legitimacy* is associated with a consequential logic and relates to whether governance arrangements are perceived as contributing to collective problem solving or societal goals—such as conservation, the wellbeing of local communities, and/or consciousness raising of ecotourists (Wearing and Wearing 1999). Analytically, impact legitimacy can be usefully broken down into two main components: (1) impact measured in terms of perceived outputs (e.g., number of participants, an area covered, and/or quantity of sustainability certified product sold)—much of the literature has so far focused on these measures, and claims to measure ‘output legitimacy’ and (2) impact measured in terms of perceived outcomes (e.g., perceptions regarding improvements in environmental conditions and/or incomes). Whether impact legitimacy is based on outputs or outcomes, it is related to the perceptions of stakeholders and their views on what benefits or costs may arise from sustainability initiatives. These should not be confused with the actual output or outcomes of these initiatives, which may or may not align with stakeholders’ perceptions.

We should note that these different dimensions of legitimacy also map rather well onto different concepts of justice. Research into social justice and conservation emphasizes that there are different aspects of justice that need to be acknowledged (Schreckenberg et al. 2016; Zafra-Calvo et al. 2019). Recognition relates to who is recognized as having a voice and needing to be heard, and this maps onto input legitimacy. Procedural justice explores how decisions are made, linking to process legitimacy. Distributive justice examines how fortune and misfortune are distributed due to conservation policies and maps onto impact legitimacy. It is important to recognize the commonalities between the literature on social justice in conservation and that pertaining to legitimacy aspects because it shows the substantive value of our approach.



## Background, Site Selection, and Methods

### Site Selection


In this article, we examine the legitimacy of sustainability initiatives in three renewable resource systems (forestry, wildlife, and coastal resources) in southern Tanzania, which are key components of rural livelihood strategies (Benjaminsen et al. 2013; Dokken and Angelsen 2015; Kalonga et al. 2015; Ponte 2002; Snyder and Sulle 2011; Sulle et al. 2011; Tolbey and Torell 2006). Using all cases from one country reduces variation concerning government policies and overall institutional frameworks. Moreover, all three cases share a similar evolution from centralized to decentralized and putatively more participatory approaches that emerged around the late 1990s—which were supposed to enhance the legitimacy of governing natural resources beyond state authority. While the case studies differ in specific resource types and particular actors involved, they all seek to attain both conservation and livelihood improvements—therefore, allowing for meaningful comparison of different degrees of legitimacy. In each resource type, we also sought to minimize variability by selecting sites that are comparable in terms of socio-economic and agro-ecological factors (all sites are in southern Tanzania) (see Fig. 1). In other words, we argue that the particular features of each resource are not per se a key determinant of different degrees of legitimacy. Thus, we focus our analysis on variation in the constitutive elements of legitimacy rather than on a comparison between resources.

For wildlife, we analyze data from four selected villages—two in each of two Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) in Rufiji District (MUNGATA and JIHU-WANGUMA) (see details in Noe et al. 2019). For forestry, we examine four villages with substantial CBFM activities in Kilwa District (see details in Mwamfupe et al. 2019). Finally, for coastal resources, we analyze four study villages within the Mnazi Bay Ruvuma Estuary Marine Park (MBREMP) to cover all three main agro-ecological areas of the marine park (seafront, interior, and riverine) and four villages that are part of two Beach Management Units (BMUs). All coastal sites are in Mtwara Rural District (see details in Kweka et al. 2019).

### Brief Background of the Selected Sites and Initiatives

One of the key stakeholders in *wildlife* conservation initiatives in Rufiji District is the Tanzania Wildlife Authority, which is charged with the protection of wildlife in and outside wildlife reserves. Equally important is the Tanzania Wildlife Research Institute, an organ under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism responsible for conducting and coordinating research. The leading NGO in wildlife conservation, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), facilitated the establishment of the MUNGATA WMA by supporting capacity building and awareness raising among the local communities. Furthermore, the Selous Conservation Program pioneered conservation initiatives, known locally as ‘Maliasili,’ in the early 1990s. Belgian Technical Cooperation, on their part, embarked on community involvement in





**Fig. 1** Location of the three study areas in Tanzania. *Source* Mwamfupe et al. (2019), Noe et al. (2019) and Kweka et al. (2019). *Note* Maps indicate all study sites covered in the NEPSUS study, including control sites that are not part of a sustainability initiative (control sites). The empirical data presented in this article, however, is restricted to the initiative sites

conservation initiatives by introducing the Eastern Selous Project in 2006 in Mloka and Ngorongo villages. Village councils are also important players in these initiatives through the Community Wildlife Management Areas Consortium, which WWF sets up with financial support from USAID in 2012. Other important partners include private hunting companies like Game Frontiers of Tanzania and Hamis Said Kibola, which appeared on the scene in the mid-1990s and 2013, respectively (for more details, see Noe et al. 2019).

*Forest management* in Kilwa District falls under two different regimes. National Forest Reserves are under the direct control of the state through the Tanzania Forest Services. District authorities, on their part, manage Local Authority Forest Reserves, including those managed by villages (Village Land Forest Reserves). The National Forest Policy of 1998 encouraged participatory and community-based forest management (CBFM) initiatives, developed first in Rufiji under the Utunzaji





was Misitu Project (UTUMI). At the end of the UTUMI Project, CBFM activities were chiefly taken over by an NGO, the Mpingo Conservation and Development Initiative (MCDI), in collaboration with the Kilwa District Council and other actors. MCDI has sustained one of the original UTUMI villages (Kikole) and has enrolled many more villages. MCDI is key in raising community awareness about CBFM and helped to set up Village Natural Resource Committees (for more details, see Kalumanga et al. 2018; Mwamfupe et al. 2019).

In *coastal resources*, one of the main initiatives that seeks to reshape conservation and development in Mtwara District is the Mnazi Bay-Ruvuma Estuary Marine Park (MBREMP). MBREMP is a state-controlled marine park, which was established in 2000. The main implementing entity is the park management authority under the supervision of the warden in charge. The team for implementing the operational activities of MBREMP includes wardens and park rangers that execute various duties ranging from enforcement, livelihood enhancement, research and monitoring, and environmental education. The other main initiative in this sector has been the setting up of BMUs. The Government of Tanzania (2003) defines a BMU as a group of devoted stakeholders in a fishing community of which main function is managing, conserving, and protecting fisheries in their locality, in collaboration with the government. In Mtwara, BMUs were first established in 2009 by the government through the Marine and Coastal Environment Management Programme (MACEMP) (a 6-year project that commenced in 2005 under the support of the World Bank). In collaboration with the Mtwara Rural District Council, WWF also helped to establish the new BMUs and strengthening their governance—and setting up Collaborative Fisheries Management Areas, which are unions of contiguous BMUs.

## Measuring Legitimacy

Based on the reflections arising from the literature—as discussed in Sect. 2—we build and apply a composite indicator of legitimacy. First, we distinguish between input and process legitimacy on the one hand and impact legitimacy on the other hand. Second, we define indicators and proxies to gauge various elements of each more precisely. Third, we draw from a survey of local communities to score each indicator and then reflect upon key informant interviews and focus group material to interpret these results. Fourth, we provide a simple aggregation measure that can assess the overall legitimacy of a sustainability initiative from the point of view of *local perceptions*.<sup>1</sup>

We analyze *input and process legitimacy* together, as there are significant overlaps between the two, through the following perception indicators:

<sup>1</sup> Due to space constraints, we do not attempt to measure legitimacy from the point of view of other actors and stakeholders (such as domestic and international NGOs or regional governments). For instance, there was a notable presence of interventions of donors agencies and international NGOs in the formation of conservation initiatives in all the three study sites. Besides leaving their mark in capacity building, awareness raising and alternative income generation schemes, this set of actors offered significant financial and technical support.





- (1) *awareness* of the initiatives and related rules and access rights to a resource; this is important in view of examining the overall knowledge in the local communities that an initiative is indeed taking place and what rules and practices are entailed in the related activities; we argue that a higher level of awareness is a precondition for legitimacy;
- (2) *acceptability*, fairness, transparency, and clarity of rules and rights—to examine whether sustainability initiatives are perceived as just and equal; we argue that a higher level of acceptability indicates a higher degree of legitimacy;
- (3) *participation*—we identify whether local-level meetings related to sustainability initiatives are well attended; this alone does not indicate the quality of participation (as meetings could be attended because the actions of the initiatives raise contentious issues), but together with other indicators, can signal better legitimacy;
- (4) *quality of community involvement*—we argue that better satisfaction with community involvement indicates better legitimacy; and
- (5) *leadership performance*—this indicator is linked to the previous one but focuses more specifically on leadership and accountability.

For *impact legitimacy*, we selected indicators that could capture perceptions on:

- (1) the *socio-economic* impacts that the initiative has had at the household and community levels; the distinction between household and community impacts is vital as we cannot assume that the two are moving the same way; we argue that improvements in both realms indicate a higher level of legitimacy;
- (2) the *environmental impacts* of the initiative concerning forest, wildlife, and coastal resources.

Our composite indicator of legitimacy is based on: (1) scoring the components of legitimacy through a points system that is linked to the assessment of intervals and averages of specific indicators; and (2) scoring the two main elements of legitimacy separately and then averaging their scores to arrive at an indicative overall legitimacy measure (see Table 8 for details).

## Data Sources

We employed a broad portfolio of data collection methods that the research team members have practiced over many years in Tanzania and elsewhere. The diversity of methods enabled critical reflection and triangulation of data. We carried out *key informant interviews* with representatives from key organizations at the national, regional, and local levels—to explore the history and current performance of



different governance arrangements, the legitimacy of sustainability initiatives, and gather perceptions on their socio-economic and environmental outcomes.<sup>2</sup> For key informant interviews, we extracted data from 235 transcripts across the three sites, i.e., WMAs villages (44); CBFMs villages (58); BMUs villages (71); and MBREMP villages (62).<sup>3</sup> In each village, we convened *focus groups* to gather data on community narratives and perceptions of environmental and socio-economic change and the history, dynamics, legitimacy, and impact of these initiatives. The focus groups were organized in places of participants' choice within villages, and targeted groups included youth, women, and mixed groups.<sup>4</sup> Coding and analysis of qualitative data involved four key steps: (a) transcription of field notes from KIIs and FGDs; (b) assigning labels for all transcribed KIIs and FGDs; (c) preparation of a codebook via Microsoft Excel which was used for data coding; and (d) importing all transcripts into the NVivo version 12 software. The analyzed data from Nvivo were then summarized, interpreted and presented based on the themes developed.

<sup>2</sup> For *wildlife*, in-depth interviews were conducted with officials involved in conservation initiatives. These included officials from the wildlife division, Tanzania Wildlife Authority, District Game Office, village government leaders, elders, the rural community, representatives from private investors, and officials from local and international conservation NGOs. Officials at donor head offices in Dar es Salaam and technical advisers of donor-funded projects were also interviewed to understand why and how donors choose to support the technical establishment of CWMA in Tanzania. For *forestry*, key informants were purposively selected from organizations directly involved in forest management at the local level. These included non-government organizations, business actors, timber buyers, government authorities, and research institutions. At the national level, we interviewed government officials from the Forestry Department and Tanzania Forestry Service Agency under the Ministry of Natural Resource and Tourism and the Tanzania Social Action Fund. We interviewed the District Forest Officer, District Beekeeping Officer, and District Natural Resource and Land Use Planner Officer and the Community Development Officer under the Kilwa District Council. We also interviewed representatives of MCDI, WWF, ActionAid, the Women organization in Kilwa (TUJIWAKI), a timber trading company, Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service, Agha Khan Foundation, and the Association of Timber Buyers in Lindi Region (UWAMBALI). At the village level, we interviewed village elders, leaders of the village government, Village Natural Resource Committee leaders, representatives from the community-based conservation network of Tanzania (MJUMITA) groups, and other community-based organizations. For *coastal resources*, officials from various organizations were purposively selected for in-depth interviews. Their selection was guided by the roles that the organizations play concerning fisheries governance. Thus, key informants here include officials from the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries, Marine Parks and Reserve Unit, TAFIRI, TIFPA (fish processors), UWAWADA (fishers association) at the national level, and District fishery officers as well as NGO employees from WWF, KIMWAM, Shirikisho, Sea Sense and Swiss Aid, and officials from MBREMP and BMUs at the district level.

<sup>3</sup> Further dis-aggregation of interview transcripts indicates that interviewees were carried out at the national, district and village levels. For wildlife sites, the distribution was as follows: 18, 15 and 11 from the national, district and village levels respectively. Likewise, 18 interviewees were drawn from the national (2) and district (16) levels whilst majority (40 respondents) were residing at the village level. In coastal sites, 3 interviews featured at the national level, 8 in the district level and the remaining 122 were drawn from BMU and MBREMP villages.

<sup>4</sup> Mixed groups involved groups participation by men and women to capture collective perceptions of legitimacy. Eight members were involved in each mixed group purposefully selected to capture their perceptions and experiences about the subject under study. Each FGD lasted between 1 and 2 h. 14 Focus groups were conducted in the wildlife sites, while 12 each were organized in forestry and coastal sites.



Finally, we administered a *questionnaire-based survey* using the Open Data Kit (ODK) as the main method to gather data for quantitative analysis of household and community-level socio-economic outcomes, perceptions of processes and functioning, and environmental outcomes. Households were selected through stratified random sampling to ensure proportional representation under different strata (male and female-headed households; different poverty/wealth ranks; household location in the village between near and far households, etc.). The questionnaires contained the same modules across resource types to compare outcomes but adapt to resource specificity. For this article, we draw from 698 questionnaires administered in 16 villages across the three resource sectors: wildlife (173), forestry (174), and coastal resources (351; two different initiatives).<sup>5</sup>

## **The Input, Process, and Impact Legitimacy of Selected Sustainability Initiatives in Southern Tanzania**

In this section, we assess the various forms and components of legitimacy concerning the selected sustainability initiatives in southern Tanzania that we examined. We do so by reporting our survey results on perceptions from local communities—based on the indicators we provided in Sect. 2—and compiling these results through a composite indicator to assess the overall legitimacy of each initiative. We also interpret these results by drawing from our qualitative data collected through key informant interviews and focus groups.

### **Input and Process Legitimacy**

#### **Awareness of Sustainability Initiatives and Knowledge of Rules and Regulations**

Comparatively, most survey respondents indicated that they were aware of the basic rules and regulations governing wildlife, forestry, and coastal resources. Specifically, a relatively large number of respondents expressed awareness of the restrictions imposed on protected areas (Tables 1, 2).

Within each sector, we noted several interesting findings. In relation to wildlife, the results of our household survey show that a minority of respondents (32%) correctly held the view that once an area is reserved for a WMA, it is no longer part of the village land. A large number of respondents (about 87%) claimed to know the basic rules of wildlife protection. But a significant number of the respondents (60%) incorrectly believed that investors could embark on securing hunting rights without consulting the authority responsible for managing the WMA. Worryingly, a

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<sup>5</sup> Several ethical aspects were considered including: (a) seeking research permits from relevant authorities (Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology-COSTECH, University of Dar es Salaam, regional and local authorities in Mtwara and Lindi regions); (b) introducing research teams to the village council offices; and (c) soliciting consent of the respondents prior to conducting interviews, FGDs and field observations.



**Table 1** Community awareness on governance of wildlife, forestry, and coastal resources

Statements	Responses		
	Correct %	Incorrect %	Don't know %
<b>Wildlife Sites</b>			
1 Intruders into the WMA are arrested and will be charged ( <i>N</i> = 173)	82	4	14
2 The WMA is no longer village land ( <i>N</i> = 173)	32	46	22
3 Investors can buy a right to hunt on the WMA without consulting the WMA authority ( <i>N</i> = 173)	13	60	27
4 Foreign hunters have to give the meat of hunted animals to the village ( <i>N</i> = 173)	48	27	25
5 WMA leaders must submit revenue and expenditure reports to the village ( <i>N</i> = 173)	69	10	21
<b>Forestry Sites</b>			
1 Intruders into the VLFR are taken to the village council to be charged ( <i>N</i> = 174)	89	6	5
2 Villagers are not allowed to collect firewood in the VLFR ( <i>N</i> = 174)	89	10	1
3 The VLFR is no longer village land ( <i>N</i> = 174)	68	24	8
4 Decisions to allocate and spend income generated from VLFR are not done by the VNRC members only ( <i>N</i> = 174)	56	36	8
5 Kilwa District Council does not receive any income from the VLFR ( <i>N</i> = 174)	68	10	22
<b>Coastal Sites</b>			
1 It is not allowed to fish in deep waters	81	8	11
2 The government is the only stakeholder with the sole responsibility of managing coastal and marine resources	MBREMP ( <i>N</i> = 173)	13	15
	BMUs ( <i>N</i> = 178)	60	6
	MBREMP ( <i>N</i> = 173)	37	8
3 Dynamite fishing is allowed in deep waters	59	39	2
4 Fishing license is only required for commercial fishing	MBREMP ( <i>N</i> = 173)	36	8
	BMUs ( <i>N</i> = 177)	27	7
	MBREMP ( <i>N</i> = 173)	55	11
5 Fishing restrictions apply to migrant fishers only	77	11	12

Table 1 (continued)

Statements	Responses		
	Correct %	Incorrect %	Don't know %
	MBREMP (N = 173)		
	69	17	14

Source NEPSUS survey



**Table 2** Aggregate levels of awareness

	Very aware (scoring 4–5) (%)	Aware (scoring 3) (%)	Less aware (scoring 1–2) (%)	Not aware (scoring 0) (%)	Total (%)
Wildlife Sites (WMAs: N=173)	36.4	40.5	12.1	11.0	100.0
Forestry Sites (CBFM: N=174)	59.8	19.5	20.7	0.0	100.0
Coastal Sites					
(BMUs: N=179)	44.1	23.5	25.7	6.7	100.0
(MBREMP: N=175)	40.0	18.3	29.1	12.6	100.0

Aggregate scores are based on responses to questions included in Table 1

Source NEPSUS survey

substantial proportion of respondents inaccurately hold the view that foreign hunters must provide part of the meat from hunted animals to the village where hunting was conducted (WFG210217). These responses indicate a general lack of knowledge about recent important changes in wildlife management regulations.

In forestry, our findings indicate that in CBFM villages, most local community members correctly identify that conservation and development activities are carried out mostly by NGOs, chiefly MCDI and other organizations. They identify local government as important but mainly through its collaboration with MCDI. A high majority of respondents know that it is forbidden to collect firewood from the VLFR (89%). Improved awareness level was confirmed in an interview in one of the CBFM villages:

The awareness level of the local community has improved, also on the importance of conserving forest and the value attached to the forest. The VNRC members received an allowance for their involvement in forest conservation, such as allowances for patrols and for VNRC meetings, and health insurance benefits. We are happy about this, and the main reason is that now you can see that people are requesting more land to be placed under the village land forest reserve. Many have seen the benefit of sustainable timber harvest (FOR39KII).

Regulations that guide management of VLFR funds reflect on issues of transparency and accountability in the eyes of local communities. Our survey findings show that slightly more than half of the respondents understand that it is imperative upon the VNRC members to involve the Village Assembly while deciding on the sensitive subject of income and expenditure. However, 36% believe that VNRC members are not consulting anyone else in deciding over-expenditure of resources. Finally, in CBFM villages, 68% of respondents are aware that the Kilwa District Council receives a share of VLFRs' revenue, an important indicator of transparency and accountability.

In coastal resources, respondents in both BMU and MBREMP villages expressed awareness of the rules and regulations associated with the protection and management of marine resources. For example, a considerable number



of respondents remarked that fishing in deep waters is not restricted. They also claim that fishers fail to reach those areas due to a lack of appropriate fishing vessels and gear. In a focus group discussion, one participant stated:

We know they restrict us from fishing in some areas of the marine park. They gave us instructions and training – that we should stop using small size nets and dynamite . . . But once you want to restrict access to fishing areas, there is also a need to consider how many people depend on those areas. We accepted these recommendations (CRFGD09).

Yet, a substantial number of survey respondents felt that handling all marine resources and the environment is the sole responsibility of the government. Overall, the survey results indicate that people have at least some level of awareness and knowledge on rules and regulations for important marine resources.

Overall, initiatives dealing with the governance of forestry resources have been relatively more successful in creating awareness on basic rules and regulations on protected areas than those operating in the coastal resource areas and with wildlife.

### **Acceptability, Fairness, and Clarity of Rules and Rights**

Our study also examined local perceptions on the fairness, clarity, and acceptability of rules and rights to access and use the three sets of resources. First, most respondents found access and use rules and rights in all three study sites to be fair, clear, and acceptable (see Table 3), but less so in WMA sites. In coastal resources, this is more so in BMU villages than in MBREMP villages. Focus group discussions and key informant interviews suggest this arises from the imposition of new restrictions on fishing gear by the marine park, which was not accompanied by the successful facilitation of alternative livelihood activities:

The relationship between MBREMP and local people was good in the early days. Nevertheless, after a few years, people challenged MBREMP, including resisting their activities. This bitter relationship emerged because people felt they would lose access to fishing resources and that MBREMP was imposing rules and restrictions that affected their livelihoods. For example, MBREMP was enforcing and controlling the use of fishing gears but without providing alternatives, and people did not like this idea. The current situation is somewhat calm, but this does not mean people fully support the MBREMP (KIIM120318).

CBFM respondents identified clear rules concerning the prohibition of farming, grazing in the VLFRs, permits for collecting non-traditional forest products, and the prohibition on harvesting small trees. This result is the main reason for transparent and protracted negotiations between MCDI officers and the village authorities. Many respondents (about 76%) readily accept these rules and regulations, especially those prohibiting forest destruction through illegal harvesting of trees, charcoal





**Table 3** Perception on fairness, clarity and acceptance of new access rules and rights in the forestry, wildlife and coastal study sites

Site	Type of partnership	<i>n</i>	Fair	Neither Fair nor Unfair	Unfair	Do not know	NA
Forestry	CBFMs	172	78	8	13	1	0
Wildlife	WMAs	172	56	12	14	16	2
Coastal	BMUs	170	71	14	12	3	0
	MBREMP	158	37	17	46	0	0
Site	Type of partnership	<i>n</i>	Clear	Neither Clear nor Unclear	Unclear	Do not know	NA
Forestry	CBFMs	174	77	14	8	1	0
Wildlife	WMAs	172	58	14	9	17	2
Coastal	BMUs	170	70	19	6	5	0
	MBREMP	159	46	27	27	0	0
Site	Type of partnership	<i>n</i>	Accept	Neither Acceptable nor Unacceptable	Unacceptable	Do not know	NA
Forestry	CBFMs	174	76	11	10	3	0
Wildlife	WMAs	172	47	15	13	22	3
Coastal	BMUs	170	62	22	11	5	0
	MBREMP	159	47	20	33	0	0

Source NEPSUS survey

Survey questions:

- *How fair do you consider the new rules introduced by the partnership for your community?*
- *How clear are the rights/rules to access and use resources that were introduced by the xx partnership?*
- *How acceptable are rights/rules to access and use resources that were introduced by the xx partnership?*

burning, farming, grazing, hunting in forest areas, and burning of forests; zoning of VLFR areas; and arresting and charging intruders.

It should be noted that parts of these communities also point out specific rules perceived to be unfair. For instance, some of the BMU and MBREMP villagers held the view that restrictions on the use of certain fishing gear, such as small-mesh nets (beach seines), and zoning of fishing areas to be unfair. Other rules considered unfair are restrictions on harvesting mangroves, on selling personal plots of land without a special permit from the marine park, and regulations around fishing licensing. In sum, even if rules are perceived to be clear, fair, and acceptable by the majority of respondents, many people hold reservations on how they are enforced and/or how their rights to access and use are considered or disregarded.



**Table 4** Attendance in the last meeting on issues related to partnership implementation

	Type of partnership	Attended (%)	Did not attend (%)
Forestry Sites	CBFM ( <i>N</i> = 174)	43	57
Wildlife Sites	WMA ( <i>N</i> = 173)	31	69
Coastal Sites	BMU ( <i>N</i> = 179)	24	76
	MBREMP ( <i>N</i> = 175)	20	80

Source NEPSUS survey

Survey question: *Did you attend the last village meeting on issues related to partnership implementation?*

### Participation in Meetings

Attendance of village-level meetings is an important avenue through which local communities can actively participate in decision-making on issues that directly or indirectly affect their welfare. Results from the survey show that attendance of meetings related to the implementation of sustainability initiatives is generally low (see Table 4). Attendance is slightly higher in CBFM villages than in WMA, BMU, and MBREMP villages. Relatively few respondents in the coastal and forestry sites reported that they had never had any meeting related to these initiatives. However, a sizeable number of respondents in the wildlife sector said they never had one.

These may represent a section of the community who are indifferent or feel that their attendance at such meetings will not make a difference. Another possible reason can be linked to recent changes in the local government structure:


For the past three years, we have not held village meetings to receive information about what is going on. The reason for this are changes in the local government structure. We were initially under the District council, but Utete has been upgraded to Township Council. The two villages were also included in the township, which means that Village councils do not operate. We now have sub-villages instead. This has huge implications because the structure of the WMA was anchored on Village councils. Sub-villages are not legal entities recognized by WMA regulations. This means there are no longer village assemblies, where reporting and decisions about WMAs are made. There is no direct connection between WMA and sub-villages. So we ask, under this arrangement, would the WMA still exist? Where do we ask for information when the village council has been dissolved? As such, WMA is made of village land, but these villages do not exist (WILD05FG).

### Quality of Community Involvement

Local perceptions of fairness, clarity, and acceptability of rules and rights to access and use of forests, coastal, and wildlife resources are one thing, but satisfaction about local community involvement in these initiatives is another. Perhaps not



### Perceptions on Satisfaction with Community Involvement



**Fig. 2** Perceptions on the quality of community involvement. *Source* NEPSUS survey. Survey question: *How satisfied are you with community involvement/participation in the partnership?*

surprisingly, respondents in villages where more community-based management initiatives are operating expressed that they are generally satisfied with their communities' involvement. In general, communities in the CBFM initiatives appear to be relatively more satisfied with their participation than those in the BMUs and WMAs initiatives (see Fig. 2).


Among the coastal sites, respondents living in BMU areas are more likely to express satisfaction than those residing in marine park villages. Indeed, one respondent described the community's relations with the MBREMP as follows:

If you introduce an issue concerning the marine park in a village meeting, it may end right there. If you talk about marine park, you add salt to an injury. The Marine Park has not held any meeting with the community here, and we are important stakeholders . . . If you want meetings not to be conducted smoothly, just introduce the issue of the marine park. The marine park has not been close to the people (KIIM120318).

A sizeable proportion of respondents across the three study sites is not impressed with the level of involvement in these initiatives. This can be linked to two sets of factors: the question of involvement of local communities in these arrangements; and the perceived benefits flowing to them. When respondents were probed further to explain why they were not satisfied with the initiative



Perceptions on the Performance of the Partnerships' Leadership



**Fig. 3** Perceptions on leadership performance. *Source* NEPSUS survey. Survey question: *How happy/unhappy are you with the current performance of the partnership leadership?*

setup, they expressed discontent about not being consulted in decision-making processes.

One telling finding is that the involvement of local communities has yet to meet the level expected even by the communities themselves. Local communities know that they ought to be engaged but hold reservations on the degree of engagement and collaboration with these initiatives. Besides lack of socio-economic benefits (see below), they also complain about unfulfilled promises, limited accessibility to farmland near forest reserves, mistrust between the initiative leadership and villagers, lack of support on alternative livelihood activities, lack of feedback on revenue generation and sharing, boundary conflicts between CBFM villages and non-CBFM villages, and crop destruction by wild animals.



## Leadership Performance

Another important element of legitimacy is whether the communities perceive the leadership of sustainability initiatives as performing per expectation. The legitimacy of an initiative can be questioned and may eventually be challenged if the target communities perceive the leadership as unresponsive, unaccountable, and untrustworthy. The results of the household survey are not especially encouraging on this aspect (see Fig. 3).

Among the three sectors, the best leadership performance was found in forestry study sites, where many were satisfied with the stewardship played by leaders concerning forest conservation awareness campaigns, participatory decision making over VLFR's income and expenditure—and concerning facilitating efforts in improving livelihoods (see Mwamfupe et al. 2019, p. 49). BMU sites are also noteworthy, as local residents credit them for awareness-raising campaigns against destructive fishing practices.

The BMUs are trying to do their best but face resistance from fishers who use illegal gear. They need assistance from the village government and the district. As villagers, we also have to support them. A BMU is made up of our people and what they have been doing is for benefit of our village. They have helped to a certain extent to raise awareness and eventually make people reduce destructive fishing activities. But they lack resources, and people work there on a voluntary basis (KIIK170318).

Overall, the top reason mentioned by respondents for their being unhappy or very unhappy were lack of involvement (especially in coastal sites)—including lack of regular interactions with communities and top-down imposition of decisions. The second top reason was a poor performance, indicated by lack of commitment, non-fulfillment of responsibilities, low pace in taking and implementing decisions, and failure to respond promptly to resource-specific problems—such as attacks on villages by wild animals. In coastal sites, unfair treatment in applying rules was cited as the second leading reason for not being impressed by leadership performance in coastal initiatives.

## Impact Legitimacy

### Perceptions on Socio-economic Impacts

Respondents were asked to mention which benefits their households had obtained from the sustainability initiatives operating in their villages. They were also asked to mention the benefits their communities had received from these initiatives. Two sets of findings arising from our survey are relevant for our discussion on impact legitimacy. First, respondents perceived receiving fewer household-level benefits than community-level benefits. As Table 5 shows, most respondents across the three sectors pointed out that, they did not accrue any direct household benefit from the sustainability initiatives, but with a lower incidence in forestry sites. Second,







**Table 5** (continued)

Perceived benefits (community level)	Resource and Partnership				Total (N = 697) (%)
	Forestry		Wildlife		
	CBFM (N = 174) (%)	WMA (N = 173) (%)	Coastal		
			BMU (N = 178) (%)	MBREMP (N = 173) (%)	
Other	7	5	3	3	5

Source NEPSUS survey

Survey questions:

- What benefit has your family obtained from partnership xx?
- What benefit has your community received from partnership xx?



**Table 6** Perceptions of livelihood change

Resource	Type of Partnership	Improved	No Change	Declined	Total (%)
Forest	CBFM ( <i>N</i> =174)	43	24	33	100
Wildlife	WMA ( <i>N</i> =173)	31	25	44	100
Coastal resources	BMUs ( <i>N</i> =179)	22	32	42	100
	MBREMP ( <i>N</i> =175)	33	27	40	100

Source NEPSUS survey

Survey question: *In general, how do you compare your livelihood condition now and 5 years ago?*

conservation knowledge was mentioned as the main benefit of the initiatives in all three sectors, followed by training opportunities.

The biggest impact of the partnerships has been that many people have changed their mindsets about forest management and understand that they own the resources. This increases their responsibility to conserve such resources sustainably. This has made some villages apply for expanding areas that should be under FSC [Forest Stewardship Council] certification (FOR01KII).

Two categories of training were mentioned: training sessions tailored at addressing conservation issues; and training sessions on alternative livelihood activities. Finally, a similar number of respondents reported having received equipment, tools, monetary payments, or support for alternative income-generating activities. These are found mostly in forestry sites and to a lesser extent in wildlife sites (see Table 5).

Regarding broader perceptions on changes in livelihoods, 43% of respondents in CBFM villages and 31% in WMA villages maintained that they have improved or have improved a lot (Table 6). In the coastal study sites, 33% of respondents from MBREMP villages reported this vis-a-vis 22% in BMU sites. Yet, with attribution of these changes, 85% of those arguing that livelihoods have improved cited farming, especially sesame cultivation, as the main causal factor in CBFM villages (Mwamfupe et al. 2019). Similarly, in the coastal sites, the reasons behind changes in livelihoods do not seem related directly to the initiatives themselves but rather to broader social, economic, and political change (Kweka et al. 2019). A decline in agricultural income due to poor harvests and dwindling prices for some farm produce were factors behind those reporting a fall in livelihood conditions (some respondents also mentioned crop destruction by wild animals in wildlife sites).

In sum, sustainability initiatives seem to have had limited effects on socio-economic and livelihood outcomes, with the possible exception of CBFM, and to be more inclined towards the provision of training on conservation issues than in facilitating the development of alternative livelihood activities.



**Table 7** Perceptions of environmental outcomes

Resource	Type of Partnership	Aspect	Better/Incr. (%)	Same as before (%)	Worse/Decr. (%)	Not known (%)
Forest	CBFM	Village forest reserve	78	12	9	1
Wildlife	WMA	Wildlife population	73	7	14	6
Coastal	BMUs	Fish Stock	41	15	41	3
		Coral health	59	25	11	5
		Mangrove cover	53	25	4	18
	MBREMP	Fish Stock	16	14	63	7
		Coral health	44	18	9	29
		Mangrove cover	45	21	10	24

Source NEPSUS survey

Survey question: *How has the condition of the village land forest reserve/status of wildlife population/fish stocks/corals/mangrove forests changed in the past 5 years?*

### Perceptions on Environmental Impacts

Many respondents held the view that environmental conditions have improved concerning forestry reserves, wildlife populations, and the status of corals and mangroves, while they were concerned with the state of fish stocks. Specifically, 78% of respondents described forest conditions in VLFRs to have improved. Likewise, over 50% of respondents in BMUs villages described better conditions for coral and mangroves, with 45% reporting so in MBREMP villages. While 73% perceived an increase in wildlife populations, 63% of MBREMP and 41% of BMUs residents reported decreased fish stocks (see Table 7).

Respondents attributed the decline in fish stocks to increasing unregulated and illegal fishing practices, population increase, and other environmental factors. They attributed the increase in wildlife populations and better conditions in forest reserves, corals, and mangroves to three common factors: improved enforcement of conservation rules, improved environmental and conservation knowledge among community members, and fewer people engaging in destructive activities.

### Combining Different Aspects of Legitimacy

In this section, we provide an aggregate legitimacy score that combines the different measures highlighted above. Table 8 shows that CBFM has established positive input and process legitimacy in the communities where they operate—across all indicators. WMAs and BMUs score lower. WMAs are perceived as having improved awareness of conservation rules (which are also perceived as acceptable, fair, and clear) but have failed to involve the communities properly, and their leadership is seen as not performing well. BMUs score less well on awareness and acceptability



Table 8 Composite scoring of legitimacy

	CBFM	WMAs	BMUs	MBREMP	Source
Awareness of conservation rules	++	++	+	+	Sum of 3, 4, and 5 scores as in Table 2
Acceptability	+	++	+	-	Average of the 'fair', 'clear' and 'acceptable' scores as in Table 3
Participation	+	-	-	-	Scores as in Table 4
Quality of community involvement	+	-	+	-	Sum of 'very satisfied' and 'satisfied' scores as in Fig. 1
Leadership performance	+	-	+	-	Sum of 'very happy' and 'happy' scores as in Fig. 2
Overall score on process legitimacy	6	1	2	-4	Sum of + and - of previous 5 lines
Socio-economic impacts of partnerships at household level	+	-	-	-	Proportion of 'none' over sum of all other impacts (%) as in Table 5
Socio-economic impacts of partnerships at community level	++	+	+	-	Proportion of 'none' over sum of all other impacts (%) as in Table 5
Perceptions on environmental outcomes	++	+	+	-	Score 'better/improved' as in Table 7
Overall score on impact legitimacy	5	1	0	-4	Sum of + and - in the previous four lines
Total legitimacy score	5.50	1.00	1.00	-4.00	Average of scores on input, process and impact legitimacy

Scoring system for 'meeting participation' and 'livelihoods':

> 50% ++, 40–50% +, 30–40% -, < 30% -

Scoring system for all other lines:

> 75% ++, 50–75% +, 25–50% -, < 25% -

Source calculation by authors



of rules, negatively on participation, but better than WMAs on community involvement and leadership quality. MBREMP is seen as failing across the board, except for the level of awareness of rules. Different ways of weighing and averaging the various indicators do not yield substantively different results.

CBFM, WMAs, and BMUs are different forms of community-based natural resource management, while MBREMP is a more top-down, state-controlled setup with (in theory) some elements of local participation. Our input and process legitimacy scoring results suggest that adding participation elements to essentially top-down systems does not seem enough to build legitimacy. Even within putatively community-driven initiatives, major differences arise between more successful (CBFM) and less successful (WMA and BMU) initiatives. While all these initiatives have successfully raised awareness of conservation rules, this is far from enough to build input and process legitimacy. Yet, as the CBFM case suggests, acceptable, fair, and clear rules are important; proper community involvement mechanisms are important, including participation in village-level meetings; and leadership and good communication are important.

This comparative picture is replicated in relation to impact legitimacy. What distinguishes CBFM from WMAs and BMUs is the presence of clear household-level benefits. Also, all three are perceived as having positively impacted socio-economic conditions at the community level and the environment, but this is far more marked in CBFM areas. The scores for MBREMP are, again, negative across the spectrum. Not only did it fail to establish input and process legitimacy, but it is also perceived as having failed to deliver the expected socio-economic outcomes. Lack of material incentives at the household level in wildlife (WMAs) and coastal resources (BMUs and MBREMP) have severely limited their legitimacy in the eyes of local communities. Fishers and consumers of bushmeat were affected by access restrictions, and/or the benefits of sustainability initiatives went to a few wealthy investors (in WMAs).

These results suggest that individual impacts of initiatives on socio-economic conditions of individual households are important and that community-level benefits are not enough to ensure legitimacy. Overall, except for CBFM, sustainability initiatives seem to have been more focused on conservation training than on ensuring that these are coupled with individual household-level benefits, in addition to the obviously important community-level benefits. In sum, the ability to create material benefits from conservation activities is necessary but not sufficient to establish legitimacy. These benefits need to reach individual households and the community. When community-level benefits are involved, fair sharing is more likely to happen when communities perceive rules as fair, are better involved in procedures, and trust their leaders.

## Conclusion

In this article, we examined selected sustainability initiatives in southern Tanzania from the perspective of perceptions held by local communities—in view of improving our understanding of how putative participatory schemes in natural resource governance gain (or fail to gain) local legitimacy. As sustainability initiatives bring



together different state and non-state actors with often diverse and competing interests, understanding the dynamics of legitimacy is therefore important.

We found that lack of material incentives in wildlife and coastal resources meant that these initiatives have struggled to gain and maintain legitimacy—despite deliberate, evolving, and persuasive efforts on raising awareness on the relevant rules and regulations. Building legitimacy needs to include the creation of awareness on the agreed norms and rules; it needs to include clarity on the eligibility to participate; and it needs mechanisms promoting accountability and transparency. But these are not sufficient for sustainability initiatives to become accepted as alternative or supplements of government policy.

In sum, improved conservation knowledge and enhanced enforcement of conservation rules have contributed to some improvements in the environmental conditions of forestry, wildlife, and coastal resources in southern Tanzania. However, sustainability initiatives have been more inclined towards training on conservation issues than on providing or facilitating tangible socio-economic benefits at the household level. They have thus failed to strike a balance of conservation and socio-economic outcomes, with the possible exception of CBFM. Our findings in large measure confirm some of the observations provided in the recent conservation-as-development literature that global restoration aspirations espoused under participatory projects such as the Restoration Opportunity Assessment Methodology (ROAM)<sup>6</sup> may run counter to local aspirations. They may actually end up demotivating and demobilizing the local community instead of gaining its approval and commitment—especially in highly conflictual settings pitting different sets of actors, like farmers, pastoralists and wildlife (Matejcek and Verne 2021). In our study, however, we also make an argument that understanding the plurality of local aspirations (Matejcek and Verne 2021) should be expanded to place premium consideration on legitimacy issues. Local perceptions on procedural fairness (procedural justice), complemented by confidence in performance of sustainability initiatives (in terms of participation and accountability) and distribution of benefits (distributive justice) are key preconditions for legitimacy.

**Acknowledgements** The material presented in this article arises from a research and capacity building project (New Partnerships for Sustainability, NEPSUS) financed through a grant by the Advisory Committee for Development Research (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Denmark), Innovation Fund Denmark (project 16 -01-CBS).

**Funding** This study was supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Denmark, Innovation Fund Denmark, Project No. 16-01-CBS.

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<sup>6</sup> ROAM, which has been developed by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and the World Resources Institute is being implemented in the contested wildlife corridors in the Kilombero Valley, Morogoro region in Tanzania.



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